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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we examine the pattern of asset concentration among 900 largest bank holding 
companies in the United States during 1986-2008. The entropy coefficient is used as a measure of 
concentration because it is said to be theoretically sound and superior to other models due to its 
decomposition properties (Theil, 1972). Decomposing 900 bank holding companies in nine 100-
subgroups and testing the within-set and between-set concentration of total assets and selected 
groups of individual assets revealed that the bottom 850 bank holding companies did not exhibit a 
noticeable change in asset concentration.  However, a significant concentration of assets took 
place among the top 50 bank holding companies. The result of this study, in light of the recent 
financial turmoil that showed the largest bank holding companies’ (i.e., Bank of America, 
Citicorp, etc.) systematic risk exceeded their ability to remain solvent, has significant policy 
implication (i.e., bail out the largest bank under the too-big to-fail doctrine). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he Congressional Oversight Panel’s 2009 Special Report on Regulatory Reform states that ―financial 
crises are not new. As early as 1792, during the presidency of George Washington, the nation 
suffered a severe panic that froze credit and nearly brought the young economy to its knees. Over the 
next 140 years, financial crises struck on a regular basis—in 1797, 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893–96, 1907, and 
1929–33 — roughly every 15 to 20 years.‖ However, to avoid systematic risk as a prime objective, new financial 
regulation — including federal deposit insurance, securities regulation, and banking supervision — effectively 
protected the system from devastating financial crisis for more than 50 years. The safety and soundness of the 
financial system changed the attitude of financial firms and policy makers to see regulation as an impediment to 
efficient functioning of the capital markets. As a result, this attitude change led to the enactment of the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 — the most important federal legislation relating to the 
financial community since the 1930s, followed by several other banking acts between 1982 and 1999, such as the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. These legislations encouraged consolidation 
of bank holding companies causing a substantial concentration of assets. Stiroh and Poole (2000) found that the rise 
in the concentration of assets among the 50 largest United States bank holding companies in the 1990s was almost 
entirely due to external growth through mergers and acquisitions. 
 
In this paper, we use the entropy coefficient as a measure of concentration to examine the asset 
concentration pattern among 900 largest bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United States during 1986-2008. 
While there is wide array of concentration measures proposed in the industrial organization literature, the review of 
banking literature reveals that the k-firm concentration ratio and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) are 
predominately used to measure bank asset concentration (Yeyati and Micco, 2007). The use of the entropy 
coefficient as a measure of concentration is said to be theoretically sound and superior to other models due to its 
decomposition properties (Theil, 1972). Applying this methodology to the U.S. BHCs, we examine the pattern of 
T 
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total assets concentration among the upper and lower tier BHCs from 1986 to 2008 (i.e., during and after regulatory 
reform of the 1980s). Furthermore, to examine the risk-taking behavior of BHCs, we also study the concentration 
patterns of selected groups of individual assets over the same time period. 
 
By decomposing 900 BHCs in nine 100-subgroups and testing within-set and between-set concentrations of 
total assets and selected groups of individual assets, we find that the largest 50 bank holding companies had 
significant increases in asset concentration, while the remaining 850 bank holding companies did not exhibit a 
noticeable change of asset concentration. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Ludwig Boltzmann (1877) has been credited for developing the entropy concept. Claude Shannon (1948) 
introduced probabilistic interpretation of entropy in information theory and Henry Theil, in his two books 
Economics and Information Theory (1967) and Statistical Decomposition Analysis (1972), developed some 
economics applications in relation to information theory. Entropy coefficient as a measure of concentration or 
diversity, is one of those economic applications that is said to be superior to other models due to its decomposition 
properties (Theil, 1972, and Attaran & Zwick, 1987). 
 
The entropy measure of concentration (C) is defined as: 
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where n is the number of BHCs and niAi ,,1,   is the ith firm’s assets relative to the sum of all BHCs’ assets, 
so 1
1
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. The entropy coefficient is an 
inverse measure of concentration: a lower coefficient of C indicates that smaller number of BHCs own most of the 
assets. For example, 0min C  represents a case of one BHC owing 100% of all assets. The highest coefficient of 
concentration is given by )(log 2max nC  and stands for all BHCs owning an equal amount of assets. Therefore, 
the concentration coefficient lies between )(log0 2maxmin nCCC  . 
 
One of the properties of the entropy is that it could be decomposed or disaggregated into between-set and 
within-set entropies (Theil, 1972). This disaggregation property is very useful when data are available for number of 
BHCs by size of their assets. In this study, we divide BHCs into subgroups ( ),...,1(  , GgSg  ) and monitor their 
asset concentration patterns over time and compare them with other subgroups. 1S is the top group of bank holding 
companies owing the largest levels of assets and GS  is the bottom group of bank holding companies owing the 
lowest levels of assets. The proportion of each subgroup of BHCs’ assets to the total BHCs’ assets is given by:  
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 When use at two, the measurement unit of entropy is known as BIT, binary digit. 
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The within-set entropy 
gS  within
C is defined by Equation (2). The entropy coefficient of concentration 
within a particular subgroup, gS , can be expressed by: 
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When the total number of BHCs is divided into subgroups, each subgroup would analytically have its own 
concentration coefficient. Weighting Equation (2) by Sg AA yields into the relative share of each subgroup to the 
total entropy, where 


G
i
iS AA
1  
. The total within-set entropy coefficient is given by Equation (3) 
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Between-set entropy is defined by Equation (4). 
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The summation of Equation (3) and Equation (4) is the overall entropy measure of all BHCs. 
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SOURCE OF BANK HOLDING COMPANY DATA 
 
We obtained financial data of BHCs from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago from the second quarter of 
1986 through the third quarter of 2008. Table 1 depicts data used in this study
2
. 
 
RESULTS 
 
We selected the top 900 BHCs for our study due to their consistency and reliability. To determine the 
pattern of the BHCs asset concentrations, we divided these 900 BHCs into nine subgroups, with each containing 100 
BHCs ranked by their asset size. After careful examination of the raw data, we decided to divide the first top 100 
BHCs into two subgroups of 50 BHCs as well. Using Equation (1) through Equation (5), we analyzed the entropy 
coefficients of total assets for the 900 BHCs and each subgroup. The result is presented in Table 2. 
 
The total assets of the top 900 BHCs (Table 2, Column 12) demonstrate a slight trend toward 
diversification between 1986-1990 (7.27 – 7.59) and thereafter, a trend change toward concentration (7.59 – 5.21). 
Clearly, BHCs were responding to the banking deregulations of 1980 through 1999. Please note that the 900 BHCs 
entropy coefficients would range from a minimum of zero to a maximum value of C = Log2900 = 9.81. The 
maximum value is used to calculate the concentration index where the higher value indicates lower concentration. 
The asset concentration index is calculated by dividing entropy coefficient by the maximum value. Obviously, since 
                                                 
2 Source: http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/bhc_data.cfm  
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1990, the BHCs have shown a remarkable degree of the total assets concentration increasing, which is indicated by 
the assets concentration index decreasing from 74% (7.27/9.81) in 1986 to 53% (5.21/9.81) in 2008. 
 
Keeping each subgroup independent and applying Equation (3), the within-set entropy coefficient of each 
subgroup is calculated and presented in Table 2, Columns 1-9. Since each subgroup consists of 100 BHCs, the 
entropy coefficients should range from a minimum of zero and a maximum value of C = Log2100 = 6.64. Column 1 
is the result of the first top 100 BHCs total assets entropy coefficients and exhibits the same pattern of changes that 
occurred in all 900 BHCs total assets reported earlier. Entropy coefficients dropped from 5.87 (88%) in 1986 to 4.49 
(67%) in 2008, signifying the concentration of total assets among the first top 100 BHCs increased. However, 
remaining subgroups (second top 100 through bottom 100) did not exhibit any significant increase in total assets 
concentration (Figure 1). In fact, the t-statistics indicate slight diversification did take place in some subgroups 
during 1986 - 2008. 
 
 
Table 1:  Item Definition Of Data Used In This Study 
 
Database 
Item 
Number 
Item Definition 
Total Assets BHCK2170 Total Assets 
Asset I 
BHCK0081 Noninterest-bearing balances and currency and coin 
BHCK0395 Interest-bearing balances in U.S. offices 
BHCK0397 Interest-bearing balances in foreign offices, edge and agreement subsidiaries and IBFs 
BHCK1350 
Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell in domestic offices of 
the bank and of its edge and agreement subsidiaries, and in IBFs 
Asset II BHCK2122 Total loans and leases, net of unearned income 
Asset III 
BHCK2145 Premises and fixed assets (including capitalized leases) 
BHCK2150 Other real estate owned 
Asset IV 
BHCK2130 Investments and unconsolidated subsidiaries and associated companies 
BHCK2155 Customers' liability to this bank on acceptances outstanding 
Asset V BHCK3164 Mortgage servicing assets 
Asset VI 
BHCK3163 Goodwill 
BHCK2160 Other assets 
SWAP 
Instruments 
BHCK3450 Interest rate contracts - notional value of all outstanding interest rate swaps 
BHCK3826 Foreign exchange swaps 
BHCK8719 Equity swaps 
BHCK8720 Commodity and other swaps 
 
 
The result of the between-set entropy coefficients is given in Column 11 of Table 2. The between-set 
figures indicate the extent to which the total assets of 900 BHCs are distributed among nine subgroups with each 
containing 100 BHCs. The entropy coefficient of 1.24 in 1986 declined to 0.56 in 2008, indicating a trend toward a 
greater between-set concentration
3
. 
 
The result of the entropy coefficients clearly confirmed our observation of the raw data indicating that most 
of the asset concentration took place among the first top 100 BHCs. Given this observation, we further divided the 
first top 100 BHCs into subgroups of the top 50 and the bottom 50. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Since there are 9 subgroups, entropy coefficients would range from a minimum of zero to a maximum 
value of C = Log29 = 3.17. 
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Table 2:  Within-Set And Between-Set Entropy Coefficients For 900 Bank Holding Companies Total Assets (1986 ~ 2008) 
 
 
Quarter 
(1) 
Within 
Set 
1st Top 
100 
(2) 
Within 
Set 
2nd Top 
100 
(3) 
Within 
Set 
3rd Top 
100 
(4) 
Within 
Set 
4th Top 
100 
(5) 
Within 
Set 
5th Top 
100 
(6) 
Within 
Set 
6th Top 
100 
(7) 
Within 
Set 
7th Top 
100 
(8) 
Within 
Set 
8th Top 
100 
(9) 
Within 
Set 
Bottom 
100 
(10) 
Total 
Weighted 
Within 
Set 
(11) 
 
Between 
Sets 
(12) 
Total 
1986 Q3 5.8715 6.5708 6.6134 6.6262 6.6383 6.6403 6.6418 6.6425 6.6406 6.0281 1.2441 7.2723 
1987 Q3 5.8702 6.5739 6.6142 6.6276 6.6382 6.6402 6.6420 6.6424 6.6422 6.0154 1.1779 7.1933 
1988 Q3 5.8965 6.5766 6.6129 6.6342 6.6373 6.6401 6.6426 6.6425 6.6424 6.0352 1.1757 7.2108 
1989 Q3 5.8930 6.5757 6.6155 6.6337 6.6379 6.6399 6.6424 6.6424 6.6426 6.0279 1.1495 7.1775 
1990 Q3 6.1079 6.5761 6.6095 6.6142 6.6371 6.6372 6.6409 6.6424 6.6420 6.2309 1.3618 7.5927 
1991 Q3 6.0758 6.5735 6.6069 6.6147 6.6351 6.6396 6.6412 6.6417 6.6426 6.2027 1.3397 7.5423 
1992 Q3 5.9350 6.5803 6.6053 6.6205 6.6330 6.6415 6.6413 6.6418 6.6427 6.0869 1.2851 7.3720 
1993 Q3 5.9541 6.5582 6.6141 6.6274 6.6361 6.6412 6.6418 6.6423 6.6429 6.0825 1.1734 7.2560 
1994 Q3 5.8530 6.5457 6.6161 6.6250 6.6372 6.6397 6.6418 6.6425 6.6431 5.9892 1.1050 7.0942 
1995 Q3 5.8516 6.5590 6.6145 6.6259 6.6372 6.6395 6.6419 6.6422 6.6429 5.9887 1.1031 7.0919 
1996 Q3 5.7149 6.5744 6.6120 6.6338 6.6394 6.6405 6.6412 6.6426 6.6428 5.8609 1.0239 6.8848 
1997 Q3 5.6542 6.5611 6.6150 6.6284 6.6408 6.6397 6.6417 6.6425 6.6429 5.7949 0.9574 6.7523 
1998 Q3 5.5409 6.5409 6.6202 6.6325 6.6393 6.6415 6.6418 6.6426 6.6430 5.6861 0.9116 6.5977 
1999 Q3 5.3875 6.5525 6.6176 6.6341 6.6395 6.6413 6.6415 6.6427 6.6427 5.5341 0.8225 6.3567 
2000 Q3 5.3686 6.5460 6.6159 6.6354 6.6401 6.6417 6.6415 6.6425 6.6430 5.4954 0.7313 6.2267 
2001 Q3 5.2140 6.5505 6.6170 6.6350 6.6403 6.6419 6.6422 6.6426 6.6428 5.3384 0.6587 5.9971 
2002 Q3 5.2768 6.5511 6.6178 6.6353 6.6403 6.6415 6.6426 6.6421 6.6431 5.4004 0.6791 6.0795 
2003 Q3 5.2657 6.5435 6.6216 6.6352 6.6407 6.6410 6.6421 6.6421 6.6433 5.3827 0.6469 6.0296 
2004 Q3 5.1785 6.5546 6.6190 6.6369 6.6392 6.6414 6.6425 6.6426 6.6430 5.2881 0.5831 5.8713 
2005 Q3 5.2285 6.5579 6.6226 6.6365 6.6395 6.6420 6.6420 6.6428 6.6430 5.3317 0.5732 5.9049 
2006 Q3 4.7505 6.5723 6.6316 6.6384 6.6409 6.6419 6.6422 6.6430 6.6416 4.9095 0.6459 5.5554 
2007 Q3 4.5729 6.5769 6.6313 6.6382 6.6407 6.6424 6.6411 6.6430 6.6406 4.7312 0.5991 5.3303 
2008 Q3 4.4920 6.5852 6.6319 6.6372 6.6415 6.6422 6.6424 6.6426 6.6406 4.6444 0.5639 5.2083 
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Figure 1:  Entropy Coefficients Of Total Assets Of 900 BHCs (In 9 Subgroups Of 100) 
 
 
The results of the entropy coefficients for the top 50 and bottom 50 BHCs total assets are given in Table 3, 
Column 1, and Table 4, Column 1, respectively. The top 50 BHCs subgroup shows a significant trend toward 
concentration of total assets (5.13 or 91% in 1986 to 4.23 or 75% in 2008) and the bottom 50 subgroup exhibits no 
concentration (5.60 or 99% both in 1986 and 2008). 
 
Applying the same methodology to the selected groups of individual assets (see Table 1), we further 
examine the concentration pattern of these assets for the top 50 and bottom 50 BHCs during 1986-2008. The results 
of the entropy coefficients of different assets are given in Tables 3 and 4, Columns 2-8. The bottom 50 BHCs’ 
entropy coefficients changed slightly while the top 50 BHCs entropy coefficients changed significantly for all 
selected types of assets. Entropy coefficients of mortgage serving assets for the top 50 BHCs increased from 3.40 in 
1986 to 4.24 in 1991 and thereafter declined steadily, to 2.83 in 2008. Asset IV (as defined in Table 1) and SWAP 
instruments exhibited a major decline in entropy coefficients in relation to all other types of assets. The most 
noteworthy item was the entropy coefficients of the SWAP instruments by the top 50 BHCs that changed from 3.76 
or 67% in 1986 to 1.84 or 33% in 2008. 
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Table 3:  Entropy Coefficients For Top 50 Bank Holding Companies Assets (1986 ~ 2008) 
Quarter 
(1) 
Total Assets 
(2) 
Asset I 
(3) 
Asset II 
(4) 
Asset III 
(5) 
Asset IV 
(6) 
Asset V 
(7) 
Asset VI 
(8) 
SWAP 
1986 Q3 5.1293 5.0540 5.0900 5.1296 4.4080 3.4025 4.7221 3.7685 
1987 Q3 5.1652 4.9190 5.1454 5.1128 4.5537 3.5515 4.6894 3.7813 
1988 Q3 5.2155 5.0578 5.1862 5.1801 4.5606 3.5677 4.8028 3.6891 
1989 Q3 5.2227 5.0523 5.1786 5.1841 4.4860 3.8475 4.7603 3.6615 
1990 Q3 5.2961 5.2014 5.2469 5.2061 4.5924 3.8521 4.8980 3.6838 
1991 Q3 5.2954 5.2575 5.2452 5.2193 4.4241 4.2351 4.9024 3.7536 
1992 Q3 5.1823 5.1310 5.1178 5.1056 4.2052 4.0842 4.7571 3.4878 
1993 Q3 5.2206 5.1621 5.1816 5.1434 4.2805 4.0304 4.7671 3.4232 
1994 Q3 5.1496 5.0665 5.1414 5.1200 4.3420 4.0373 4.8904 3.2680 
1995 Q3 5.1484 5.0618 5.1484 5.1121 4.3552 3.9694 4.9445 3.1664 
1996 Q3 5.0589 5.0565 5.0757 4.9889 4.3561 3.6493 4.8869 2.8604 
1997 Q3 5.0385 4.5308 5.1037 4.9962 4.3292 3.9751 4.8906 2.7512 
1998 Q3 4.9439 4.3622 4.9947 4.9348 4.2094 3.9572 4.7515 2.7935 
1999 Q3 4.8197 4.2798 4.8872 4.8947 4.1911 3.9025 4.5311 3.0100 
2000 Q3 4.8589 4.3278 4.8848 4.9573 4.1286 3.9839 4.6224 3.0139 
2001 Q3 4.7616 4.2728 4.8146 4.8827 4.0974 3.8799 4.4481 2.7624 
2002 Q3 4.7980 4.8274 4.8238 4.8858 4.0433 3.8762 4.5854 2.8101 
2003 Q3 4.8013 4.7485 4.8427 4.9687 4.0829 3.8633 4.5517 2.8305 
2004 Q3 4.7492 4.6784 4.8200 4.9178 4.0601 3.9927 4.5801 2.9106 
2005 Q3 4.8273 4.7249 4.8819 4.9341 3.9271 3.8787 4.7016 2.9043 
2006 Q3 4.4282 4.3310 4.5645 4.7161 3.2199 3.2643 4.1672 1.9449 
2007 Q3 4.2851 4.0700 4.4234 4.6309 3.0744 2.9947 4.1591 1.7969 
2008 Q3 4.2258 3.9656 4.3420 4.5275 3.0745 2.8325 4.1072 1.8441 
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Table 4:  Entropy Coefficients For Bottom 50 Bank Holding Companies Assets (1986 ~ 2008) 
Quarter 
(1) 
Total Assets 
(2) 
Asset I 
(3) 
Asset II 
(4) 
Asset III 
(5) 
Asset IV 
(6) 
Asset V 
(7) 
Asset VI 
(8) 
SWAP 
1986 Q3 5.5959 5.4793 5.5726 5.5267 4.2573 3.7783 5.4167 4.6065 
1987 Q3 5.5902 5.3915 5.5731 5.5029 4.3733 3.5351 5.4556 4.4443 
1988 Q3 5.5926 5.3950 5.5789 5.4908 4.2074 2.9508 5.4559 4.4735 
1989 Q3 5.5898 5.3692 5.5654 5.5072 3.9731 3.9220 5.4392 4.3387 
1990 Q3 5.6118 5.4302 5.5975 5.5049 4.7373 3.0845 5.1477 4.7359 
1991 Q3 5.6068 5.3477 5.6013 5.4796 4.6176 3.6135 5.4060 4.7541 
1992 Q3 5.5957 5.3549 5.5922 5.5051 4.0031 2.5726 5.4127 4.7238 
1993 Q3 5.5943 5.3621 5.5945 5.4964 3.7703 3.7321 5.3572 4.9060 
1994 Q3 5.5999 5.4445 5.5978 5.4978 3.6720 3.7387 5.4383 4.8729 
1995 Q3 5.5940 5.4805 5.5900 5.5105 3.6564 3.7224 5.5247 4.5575 
1996 Q3 5.5712 5.4708 5.5667 5.4924 3.1812 3.5083 5.4435 4.3088 
1997 Q3 5.5537 5.3782 5.5533 5.4894 4.2909 3.8300 5.3644 4.3090 
1998 Q3 5.5360 5.4134 5.5242 5.4892 3.9686 3.5303 5.2951 4.4007 
1999 Q3 5.5292 5.2950 5.5080 5.4442 3.2432 3.2847 5.2203 3.4005 
2000 Q3 5.5164 5.1052 5.5112 5.4059 4.0973 3.2975 5.1818 4.4359 
2001 Q3 5.5322 4.9249 5.5199 5.3988 4.0307 3.2404 5.1870 4.2486 
2002 Q3 5.5328 5.3666 5.4917 5.3588 4.1074 3.5024 5.1863 4.3621 
2003 Q3 5.5309 5.3047 5.4794 5.3143 3.6627 3.4149 5.1215 4.2845 
2004 Q3 5.4899 5.1678 5.4153 5.3390 3.9594 2.8397 5.1466 4.4353 
2005 Q3 5.4448 5.2354 5.3316 5.2796 1.9568 2.2994 5.0904 4.3965 
2006 Q3 5.5822 5.3265 5.5200 5.3087 3.5897 3.4988 5.4296 3.9625 
2007 Q3 5.5908 5.4665 5.5429 5.3291 3.3973 3.3205 5.3650 4.2821 
2008 Q3 5.5997 5.0387 5.5453 5.3441 3.2309 3.1395 5.4174 4.1630 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the recent financial turmoil which showed that the largest bank holding companies’ (i.e., Bank of 
America, Citicorp, etc.) systematic risk exceeded their ability to remain solvent, the result of this study has a 
significant policy implication (i.e., bail out the largest bank under the too-big to-fail doctrine). 
 
Among the largest 900 BHCs in the United States, only the top 50 exhibited significant rise in total assets 
concentration during 1986-2008, while the remaining 850 BHCs did not exhibit any noticeable change in total assets 
concentration. Similarly, the concentration of the selected groups of individual assets also increased only among the 
50 largest BHCs. What is more revealing is the substantial increase in usage of SWAPs as hedging instruments by 
the largest BHCs in the United States. 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
 
Dan Zhou earned her Ph.D. at the University of Memphis. Currently she is an assistant professor of finance at 
California State University-Bakersfield. Her research interests include market microstructure, investment and 
empirical finance. She has published in peer review journals and made presentations at 
international/national/regional conferences. 
 
Ken Shakoori earned his Ph.D. at Clark University. Currently he is an emeritus Professor of Finance at California 
State University-Bakersfield. He has a long-standing interest in both applied and theoretical issues in finance. His 
current research interests include business valuation, banking and securities markets. He has published in peer-
reviewed journals and made presentations at national and international conferences.   
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Attaran, Mohsen, and Martin Zewick. (1987) Entropy and Other Measures of Industrial Diversification. 
Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 26, 17-34. 
2. Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine. (2005) Bank Concentration and Fragility: Impact 
and Mechanics. NBER Working Paper No. W11500, National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2005. 
3. Berger, Allen N., Rebecca S. Demsetz, and Philip E. Strahan. (1999) The Consolidation of the Financial 
Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 23:2-4, 135-94. 
4. Bergstresser, Daniel. (2004) Market concentration and loan portfolios in commercial banking. Harvard 
Business School; January 2004. 
5. Davis, Kevin. (2007) Banking Concentration, Financial Stability and Public Policy. In The Structure and 
Resilience of the Financial System, pp. 255-284. Reserve Bank of Australia. 
6. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Luc Laeven, and Ross Levine. (2004) Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, 
and the Cost of Financial Intermediation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36:3-2, 593-622. 
7. De Nicolo, Gianni, and Elena Loukoianova. (2007) Bank Ownership, Market Structure and Risk. IMF 
Working Paper No. 07/215, International Monetary Fund, September2007. 
8. Schaeck, Klaus, Cihak, Martin and Wolfe Simon, Competition, Concentration and Bank Soundness: New 
evidence from the Micro-Level IMF, November 2006. 
9. Stiroh, Kevin J., and Jennifer Poole. (2000) Explaining the Rising Concentration of Banking Assets in the 
1990s. Federal Reserve Bank of New York: Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 6:9 August 2000. 
10. Theil, Henry. (1967) Economics and Information Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
11. Theil, Henry. (1972) Statistical Decomposition Analysis. New York, NY: American Elsevier 
12. Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, and Alejandro Micco. (2007) Concentration and Foreign Penetration in Latin 
American Banking Sectors: Impact on Competition and Risk. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31:6, 1633-
1647 
  
Journal of Business & Economics Research – July 2011  Volume 9, Number 7 
30 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
NOTES 
